Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?
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Publication:869887
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.08.002zbMATH Open1142.91482OpenAlexW1981422914MaRDI QIDQ869887FDOQ869887
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.002
Cites Work
- Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
- Second best taxation as a game
- Some comments on majority rule equilibria in local public good economies
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
- Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods
- Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy
Cited In (5)
Recommendations
- The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government π π
- Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods π π
- The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights π π
- Free mobility and taste-homogeneity of jurisdiction structures π π
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain π π
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