The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government
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Cites work
- Competition among institutions
- Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?
- Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods
- Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
- Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting
- General equilibrium and optimal taxes
- Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
- Population issues in social choice theory, welfare economics, and ethics.
- Reformulation of the Nash social welfare function for a continuum of individuals
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- The Nash social welfare function for a measure space of individuals
- Topological aggregation of preferences: the case of a continuum of agents
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