Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90027-3zbMath0647.90013OpenAlexW2135106589MaRDI QIDQ1104838

Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90027-3

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalition formationlocal public goodsgroup formationlarge economiesjurisdictionscollective consumptionstable partition of individuals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (16)

Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core ⋮ A Tiebout theorem ⋮ On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects ⋮ Club theory and household formation ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Groups, collective decisions and markets ⋮ Power at general equilibrium ⋮ On efficient firm formation ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics ⋮ Clubs and the market: Large finite economies ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization ⋮ Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores ⋮ Household formation and markets

Cites Work

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• Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
• The epsilon core of a large replica game
• Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
• Human environment as a local public good
• Efficient Exchange with a Variable Number of Consumers
• The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
• The Core of an N Person Game

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