Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90027-3zbMath0647.90013OpenAlexW2135106589MaRDI QIDQ1104838

Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90027-3

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalition formationlocal public goodsgroup formationlarge economiesjurisdictionscollective consumptionstable partition of individuals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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