Power at general equilibrium
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Publication:1703361
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1091-3zbMath1392.91115OpenAlexW2766624332MaRDI QIDQ1703361
Publication date: 2 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1091-3
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