Bargaining cum voice

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0471-8MaRDI QIDQ622575zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller

Publication date 3 February 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0471-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

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Cited in

(3)

• Power at general equilibrium
• Groups, collective decisions and markets
• A simple model of voice

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