The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
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Publication:3378952
zbMATH Open1084.91502MaRDI QIDQ3378952FDOQ3378952
Authors: Joseph Greenberg 
Publication date: 5 April 2006
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- The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
- Iterated elimination procedures
- Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
- Strategic advertising: the fat-cat effect and stability
- Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
- Farsighted house allocation
- Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems
- Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
- Resource conservation across generations in a Ramsey-Chichilnisky model
- Majority voting leads to unanimity
- Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games
- Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games
- Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
- Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations
- A model of agreements in strategic form games
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
- General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
- Theories of coalitional rationality
- The supercore for normal-form games
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- Informal insurance in social networks
- Farsighted stability in average return games
- A unique solution to \(n\)-person sequential bargaining
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction
- Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
- Theory of conditional games
- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- On the foundation of stability
- Bargaining cum voice
- Farsightedly stable tariffs
- Pillage and property
- Set-theoretic equivalence of extensive-form games
- On stable social laws and qualitative equilibria
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Payoffs in generalized sequential bargaining games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
- Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
- On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
- Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
- The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
- Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies.
- Moral norms in a partly compliant society
- Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?
- Competition and networks of collaboration
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- Coalition formation under dominance invariance
- Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Optimistic stability in games of perfect information
- Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements
- Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation
- Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players
- Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency
- Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma
- On stability of economic networks
- Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets
- The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency
- von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies
- International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
- The core of school choice problems
- The reciprocity set
- Tie-breaking in games of perfect information
- Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
- Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks
- Problematic social situations and the “large‐number dilemma” a game‐theoretical analysis*
- A combinatorial theory of minimal social situations
- On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
- The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of \(2\times 2\) games
- A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games
- Endogeneous formation of coalitions in noncooperative games
- Social norms and core outcomes in a sharecropping economy
- Implementation via rights structures
- Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Emergent collaboration in social purpose games
- Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
- Economy and disability. A game theoretic approach
- Fair stable sets of simple games
- Names for games: locating \(2 \times 2\) games
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system
- Robust equilibria in tournaments
- Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
- Conservative vs optimistic rationality in games: a revisitation
- The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games
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