The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0527-9zbMath1398.91036OpenAlexW2272221955MaRDI QIDQ521883

Toshiyuki Hirai

Publication date: 12 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0527-9

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcommitment(abstract) systemsocial conflict gametheory of social situations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games

Cites Work

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