The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency

DOI10.1007/S00182-016-0527-9zbMATH Open1398.91036OpenAlexW2272221955MaRDI QIDQ521883FDOQ521883

Authors: Toshiyuki Hirai 

Publication date: 12 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0527-9

Recommendations

• A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 219990
• On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• On the existence and efficiency of the von neumann-morgenstern stable set in a \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma
• An analysis of stability sets in pure coordination games
• Existence of equilibria for generalized games and generalized social systems with coordination
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3948033
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1031405
• The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentstable set(abstract) systemsocial conflict gametheory of social situations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Stable cartels revisited
• Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
• Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma
• The Proof That a Game May Not Have a Solution
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
• Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system
• On the existence and efficiency of the von neumann-morgenstern stable set in a \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma

Cited In (3)

• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
• A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
• Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games

This page was built for publication: The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q521883)