A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002376MaRDI QIDQ3402040zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan C. Cesco

Publication date 2 February 2010

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002376

zbMATH Keywords

existence theoremsocially stable coretransferable utility games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

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• Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core
• The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency
• The existence of TU -core in normal form games
• An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• Socially structured games
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• THE WEIGHTED CORE WITH DISTINGUISHED COALITIONS

Cited in

(8)

• Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core
• Socially structured games
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
• Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core
• Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core
• The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency
• A simple way to obtain the sufficient nonemptiness conditions for core of TU game

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