The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.04.008MaRDI QIDQ2371152zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gerard van der Laan, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dolf Talman

Publication date 29 June 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://papers.tinbergen.nl/04043.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchysocial structuresocially stable coretransferable utility game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited in

(14)

• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem
• Socially structured games
• A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES
• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency
• A decomposition of transferable utility games: structure of transferable utility games
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
• Collective decision making in an international river pollution model
• The existence and Hadamard well-posedness of cooperative equilibria for discontinuous socially structured games
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• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note
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