Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- A limit theorem on the minmax set
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Cores of partitioning games
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Natural Oligopolies
- Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Sustainable oligopolies
- The Core of an N Person Game
Cited in
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- Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals
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- The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough
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- A characterization of the single-crossing domain
- Political mergers as coalition formation: an analysis of the \textit{Heisei} municipal amalgamations
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- Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs
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- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
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