Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
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Publication:1427494
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00133-9zbMath1063.91006OpenAlexW2082549110MaRDI QIDQ1427494
Shlomo Weber, Ori Haimanko, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 14 March 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00133-9
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