Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90069-9MaRDI QIDQ761336zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shlomo Weber, Shmuel Zamir

Publication date 1985

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90069-9

zbMATH Keywords

public goodproportional taxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies
• Private Provision of Public Goods and the Failure of the Neutrality Property in Large Finite Economies
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
• Equilibrium in a Production Economy with an Income Tax

Cites work

• Second best taxation as a game
• The equivalence of superadditivity and balancedness in the proportional tax game

Cited in

(8)

• Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities
• Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
• ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
• Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
• Production efficiency and profit taxation
• von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies

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