Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
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Cited in
(32)- Market games and clubs
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
- Second best taxation as a game
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- On the accessibility of core-extensions
- Efficient club formation in a frictional environment
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
- The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights
- Household formation and markets
- Endogenous formation of security exchanges
- Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?
- Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
- Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
- Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
- On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects
- A Tiebout theorem
- Dynamic club formation with coordination
- Capitalization, decentralization, and intergenerational spillovers in a tiebout economy with a durable public good
- ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
- Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
- Tiebout and sympathy
- Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
- Local public good equilibrium
- Equilibria, the core and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good: A correction
- Weakly democratic regular tax equilibria in a local public goods economy with perfect consumer mobility
- Corrigendum to ``When is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods?
- Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games
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