Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good

Cites Work

Title not available (Why is that?)
A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
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Cited In (32)

Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
Second best taxation as a game
Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
Efficient club formation in a frictional environment
Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
On the accessibility of core-extensions
Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights
Household formation and markets
Endogenous formation of security exchanges
Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?
Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects
A Tiebout theorem
Dynamic club formation with coordination
Capitalization, decentralization, and intergenerational spillovers in a tiebout economy with a durable public good
``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core
Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
Tiebout and sympathy
Local public good equilibrium
Equilibria, the core and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good: A correction
Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games
Weakly democratic regular tax equilibria in a local public goods economy with perfect consumer mobility
Corrigendum to ``When is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods?
Market games and clubs

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