Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
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Publication:794935
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90044-6zbMath0541.90100OpenAlexW2054239968WikidataQ110908830 ScholiaQ110908830MaRDI QIDQ794935
Myrna Holtz Wooders, Martin Shubik
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90044-6
local public goodsexternal economiesnon-convexitiesdiseconomiesindivisibilitiesnon-emptiness of approximate coressequences of replica games
Related Items
Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core ⋮ Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem ⋮ Large games: Fair and stable outcomes ⋮ Replica economies with congested public goods ⋮ Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods ⋮ A Tiebout theorem ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Dynamic club formation with coordination ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ The instability of instability of centered distributions ⋮ The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results ⋮ Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)
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