The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies

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Publication:3887165

DOI10.2307/1912819zbMath0443.90007OpenAlexW2063034060MaRDI QIDQ3887165

Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912819




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