Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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- Replica economies with congested public goods
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- The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
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Cited in
(11)- Market games and clubs
- Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
- Applications of game theory to economics
- The not-quite non-atomic game: non-emptiness of the core in large production games
- On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
- Small improving coalitions and small group effectiveness
- Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
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