Cores of partitioning games
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Publication:1168899
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90015-4zbMath0493.90089MaRDI QIDQ1168899
Myrna Holtz Wooders, Mamoru Kaneko
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d06/d0620.pdf
approximate core; partitioning games; essential coalitions; game replication; generalized assignment games; nonemptiness of the cores
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