Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences

DOI10.2307/1910101zbMath0154.45303OpenAlexW1989872469WikidataQ56387536 ScholiaQ56387536MaRDI QIDQ5535559

Publication date: 1966

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/42fe3bef16017097385f3ec97bf01c1ebae7c9f9

zbMATH Keywords

operations research

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