Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1762423
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0608-8zbMath1261.91003MaRDI QIDQ1762423
Publication date: 26 November 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24995/1/MPRA_paper_24995.pdf
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A12: Cooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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