Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0620-YzbMATH Open1106.91020OpenAlexW2235081734MaRDI QIDQ2494015FDOQ2494015

Authors: Tasos Kalandrakis 

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0620-y

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zbMATH Keywords

sequential bargaininglocal uniqueness of equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Discrete-time games (91A50)

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• Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
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• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
• Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models
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• Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
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