Regular equilibrium points of bimatrix games
From MaRDI portal
The author introduces a new definition of a regular equilibrium point of a bimatrix game. The concept was introduced by \textit{J. C. Harsanyi} [Int. J. Game Theory 2, 235-250 (1973; Zbl 0274.90085)] and further developed by \textit{E. E. C. van Damme} [``Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept (1983; Zbl 0523.90095)]. The new definition is related to a linear complementarity problem and is shown to be equivalent to the original one. Finally, the strong stability of regular equilibria is discussed.
Recommendations
Cites work
- A generalization of an oddness-theorem for bimatrix games
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Non-cooperative games
- Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
- Strictly perfect equilibrium points of bimatrix games
- Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games
Cited in
(6)- Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points
- On proper refinement of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games
- Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
- Existence of equilibrium points for bimatrix game with interval payoffs
- A symmetrization for finite two-person games
- On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria
This page was built for publication: Regular equilibrium points of bimatrix games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1095051)
