The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint

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Publication:1332125

DOI10.1007/BF01247316zbMath0819.90133MaRDI QIDQ1332125

Klaus Ritzberger

Publication date: 8 September 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)




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