On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
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Publication:1851229
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2856zbMath1041.91005OpenAlexW3121770234MaRDI QIDQ1851229
Publication date: 16 December 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/737
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