Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
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Publication:5286045
DOI10.2307/2951552zbMath0793.90100MaRDI QIDQ5286045
Larry Samuelson, George J. Mailath, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/70ea0062a97c33167481b553cc8cfc0494bade4f
subgame perfection; extensive form games; sequential equilibrium; forward induction; information sets; subgames; strategic independence
91A10: Noncooperative games
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