Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games

DOI10.2307/2951552zbMATH Open0793.90100OpenAlexW1996328213MaRDI QIDQ5286045FDOQ5286045

Authors George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date 29 June 1993

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/70ea0062a97c33167481b553cc8cfc0494bade4f

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamessequential equilibriumsubgame perfectionforward inductioninformation setssubgamesstrategic independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cited in

(22)

• Formalizing opponent modeling with the rock, paper, scissors game
• On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
• On the equivalence of normal and extensive form representations of games
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
• Forward induction equilibrium
• Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
• On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
• Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
• How proper is sequential equilibrium?
• Normal form structures in extensive form games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 124464 (Why is no real title available?)
• Structural rationality in dynamic games
• The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
• Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
• The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 733398 (Why is no real title available?)
• An example of reflexive analysis of a game in normal form
• Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models

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