Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5286045
DOI10.2307/2951552zbMATH Open0793.90100OpenAlexW1996328213MaRDI QIDQ5286045FDOQ5286045
Authors: George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels 
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/70ea0062a97c33167481b553cc8cfc0494bade4f
Recommendations
extensive form gamessequential equilibriumsubgame perfectionforward inductioninformation setssubgamesstrategic independence
Cited In (21)
- Forward induction equilibrium
- An example of reflexive analysis of a game in normal form
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Normal form structures in extensive form games
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the equivalence of normal and extensive form representations of games
- Formalizing opponent modeling with the rock, paper, scissors game
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
- On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
- Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Structural rationality in dynamic games
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
- On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
- Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
This page was built for publication: Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5286045)
