An example of reflexive analysis of a game in normal form

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_1MaRDI QIDQ2008294zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors D. N. Fedyanin

Publication date 25 November 2019

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_1

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintygame theorysocial networkscontrolinformation controlcollective actionsde Groot's modelepistemic modelslogic models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(2)

• Ordering in games with reduced memory and planning horizon of players
• Reflexive and epistemic properties of the Tullock rent-seeking game

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