Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
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Cited in
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- An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
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- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- An example of reflexive analysis of a game in normal form
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- Formalizing opponent modeling with the rock, paper, scissors game
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- Forward induction equilibrium
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- Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
- Structural rationality in dynamic games
- On the equivalence of normal and extensive form representations of games
- Level-k thinking in the extensive form
- Partially constructed sequential equilibrium
- Solid outcomes in finite games
- On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
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