Partially constructed sequential equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2025.106111MaRDI QIDQ6856918zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Joel Watson

Publication date 18 February 2026

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2025.106111

zbMATH Keywords

partial equilibriumappraisalscontractual chainsdecentralized contractingfull consistency for belief updatingmultistage games with observed actions and independent typessequential equilibrium applications

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
• Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Contractual chains
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
• Information flows and memory in games
• On Forward Induction
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality

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