Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0082MaRDI QIDQ1815202zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierpaolo Battigalli

Publication date 7 November 1996

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0082

zbMATH Keywords

independence propertysubgame perfection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Recommendations

• Structural consistency and strategic independence in extensive games
• Bayesian and consistent assessments
• On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria

Cited in

(29)

• Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
• Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks
• Dynamic interactive epistemology
• On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities
• Vagueness in multidimensional proposals
• Independence for full conditional probabilities: structure, factorization, non-uniqueness, and Bayesian networks
• Subjective reasoning -- solutions
• Bayesian and consistent assessments
• Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
• Temporal interaction of information and belief
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties
• On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium
• PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES
• Periodic strategies. II: Generalizations and extensions
• Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
• Partially constructed sequential equilibrium
• Normative standards in logic and game theory: structural parallels
• Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
• Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• A simple modal logic for belief revision
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
• The equivalence of Bayes and causal rationality in games
• Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
• Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models

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