Dynamic interactive epistemology
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Recommendations
- Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
- The language of game theory. Putting epistemics into the mathematics of games. With a foreword by Eric S. Maskin
- Interactive epistemology. II: Probability
Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795590 (Why is no real title available?)
- Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
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- Knowledge spaces with arbitrarily high rank
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Cited in
(70)- Probabilistic dynamic belief revision
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- Interactive epistemology. II: Probability
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- Nested sequent calculi for conditional logics
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- A dynamic analysis of interactive rationality
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7444870 (Why is no real title available?)
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- My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic
- Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
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