Strategic Information Transmission
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Voice matters in a dictator game
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
- Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
- Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?
- Optimum/near-optimum incentive policies for stochastic decision problems involving parametric uncertainty
- Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under imperfect information
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk
- Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- Fixed cost messages
- Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
- Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule
- Modelling the role of information in elections
- Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
- Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
- A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
- Optimal policy in a model of endogenous fluctuations and assets
- Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
- Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
- Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
- Cheap talk and burned money
- Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
- Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
- A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
- Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
- Coordination and private information revelation
- A new methodology for surveys and its application to forced response
- Dynamic communication with biased senders
- Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
- Network formation when players seek confirmation of information
- Information control in reputational cheap talk
- Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice
- Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
- Near-optimal asymmetric binary matrix partitions
- Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
- Communication under language barriers
- Full revelation under optional verification
- Strategic central bank communication: discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan's monthly report
- Manipulated news model: electoral competition and mass media
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge
- Receiver's dilemma
- Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
- Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games
- Incentives and the structure of communication
- Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
- Communication with evidence in the lab
- Ambiguous persuasion
- Pragmatic languages with universal grammars
- When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion
- Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk
- Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals
- Hiding information in electoral competition.
- Credible debate equilibria
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Games with espionage
- Dynamic interactive epistemology
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Mediated talk
- The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
- A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission
- Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
- Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits
- Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility
- Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
- The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
- Conformism and public news
- Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
- Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects
- Creating confusion
- The value of mediated communication
- Strategic interpretations
- Learning from like-minded people
- Modes of ambiguous communication
- Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation
- Comments on ``Strategic information transmission
- Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Revenue-sharing between developers of virtual products and platform distributors
- The effect of information asymmetry on ordering and capacity decisions in supply chains
- Buying supermajorities in the lab
- On the value of repetition for communication games
- On convergence of sequences in complete lattices
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
- Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
- Persuading a pessimist: simplicity and robustness
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
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