Communication with evidence in the lab
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Publication:1756334
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002zbMath1419.91189OpenAlexW2895870492MaRDI QIDQ1756334
Jeanne Hagenbach, Eduardo Perez-Richet
Publication date: 14 January 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002
information disclosuresender-receiver gameskepticismhard evidencemasquerade relationobvious dominance
Related Items (4)
Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment ⋮ Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment ⋮ The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Communication-enhancing vagueness
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