Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles

DOI10.1111/IERE.12384zbMATH Open1444.91110OpenAlexW2909296234WikidataQ128559030 ScholiaQ128559030MaRDI QIDQ3299199FDOQ3299199

Authors: Peter Troyan 

Publication date: 17 July 2020

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://people.virginia.edu/~pgt8y/Troyan-OSP-TTC.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationstrategy-proofnesstop trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cited In (12)

• Top trading cycles
• On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
• Communication with evidence in the lab
• On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
• Level-k reasoning in school choice
• Obvious manipulations
• The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof

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