Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles

DOI10.1111/IERE.12384MaRDI QIDQ3299199zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Peter Troyan

Publication date 17 July 2020

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://people.virginia.edu/~pgt8y/Troyan-OSP-TTC.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationstrategy-proofnesstop trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited in

(13)

• On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
• Obvious manipulations
• Top trading cycles
• On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
• The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism
• All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
• Communication with evidence in the lab
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• Level-k reasoning in school choice

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