Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization

DOI10.1111/IERE.12538zbMATH Open1486.91041OpenAlexW3105910811MaRDI QIDQ5072059FDOQ5072059

Authors:

Publication date: 25 April 2022

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12538

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cited In (4)

• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof

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