Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
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Recommendations
- Efficient priority rules
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
Cites work
- A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Efficient priority rules
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement
- Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
Cited in
(6)- A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
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