Axioms for Deferred Acceptance

DOI10.3982/ECTA7443zbMath1229.91246OpenAlexW2112845715MaRDI QIDQ3564693

Publication date: 26 May 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7443

zbMATH Keywords

population monotonicity axioms deferred acceptance algorithm stable allocations weak Maskin monotonicity non-wastefulness individually rational monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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