Axioms for deferred acceptance
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Publication:3564693
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- School choice with preference rank classes
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- On capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- Stable and extremely unequal
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
- New axioms for immediate acceptance
- Essentially stable matchings
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems
- On lexicographic choice
- Making just school assignments
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- New axioms for deferred acceptance
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
- Delayed Acceptance ABC-SMC
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
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