New axioms for immediate acceptance

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0194-0MaRDI QIDQ682464zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yajing Chen

Publication date 2 February 2018

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationfavoring higher ranksimmediate acceptance algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• Making just school assignments
• New axioms for deferred acceptance
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

Cited in

(5)

• Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
• Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
• New axioms for deferred acceptance
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• New axioms for top trading cycles

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