New axioms for deferred acceptance
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Publication:2397664
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-1010-ZzbMATH Open1392.91127OpenAlexW2560284039MaRDI QIDQ2397664FDOQ2397664
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1010-z
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
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- Making just school assignments
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- New axioms for immediate acceptance
- Monotonicity, stability and egalitarianism
Cited In (7)
- New axioms for immediate acceptance
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- New axioms for top trading cycles
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