New axioms for deferred acceptance

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-1010-ZMaRDI QIDQ2397664zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yajing Chen

Publication date 23 May 2017

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1010-z

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptanceallocation of indivisible object set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584 (Why is no real title available?)
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Consistency and its converse: an introduction
• Making just school assignments
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• Monotonicity, stability and egalitarianism
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• New axioms for immediate acceptance
• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

Cited in

(11)

• A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
• New axioms for immediate acceptance
• Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
• New axioms for top trading cycles

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