New axioms for deferred acceptance
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Publication:2397664
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-1010-zzbMath1392.91127MaRDI QIDQ2397664
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1010-z
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B68: Matching models
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