Making just school assignments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.05.004MaRDI QIDQ2516227zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Thayer Morrill

Publication date 12 August 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

assignmentschool choicetop trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• Constrained school choice

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles

Cited in

(19)

• Top trading cycles
• New axioms for immediate acceptance
• Trading probabilities along cycles
• A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
• Fair student placement
• Family ties: school assignment with siblings
• New axioms for deferred acceptance
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
• The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
• Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
• Sticky matching in school choice
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• Competitive equilibria in school assignment
• New axioms for top trading cycles
• Stability vs. no justified envy
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• Essentially stable matchings

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