Sticky matching in school choice

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0995-YMaRDI QIDQ683828zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zeynel Harun Alioğulları, Mehmet Barlo, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date 9 February 2018

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0995-y

zbMATH Keywords

manipulationdeferred-acceptance mechanismefficiency-corrected deferred-acceptance mechanismefficiency-improving deferred-acceptance mechanismstickiness degreesticky-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Constrained school choice
• Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
• Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
• School Choice with Consent^*
• School choice with neighbors

Cites work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Making just school assignments
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• School Choice with Consent^*
• School choice under partial fairness
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Truncation strategies in matching markets
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles

Cited in

(7)

• The core of school choice problems
• Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
• School choice with vouchers
• Stable matchings of teachers to schools
• Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
• Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges
• Epsilon-stability in school choice

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