Epsilon-stability in school choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1060-XMaRDI QIDQ1697834zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chao Huang, Qianfeng Tang, Ziwei Wang

Publication date 20 February 2018

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1060-x

zbMATH Keywords

school choiceordinal preferencecardinal scoreepsilon-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
• Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
• Constrained school choice
• Sticky matching in school choice
• School choice under partial fairness

Cites work

• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Stable matching in large economies
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

Cited in

(2)

• The core of school choice problems
• Inference on an extended Roy model, with an application to schooling decisions in France

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