On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
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Publication:485776
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009zbMath1302.91153OpenAlexW1976842437MaRDI QIDQ485776
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009
efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithmstrictly strong Nash equilibriumstudent-optimal deferred acceptance algorithmstudent-optimal von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matching
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