On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.009zbMATH Open1302.91153OpenAlexW1976842437MaRDI QIDQ485776FDOQ485776
Authors: Keisuke Bando 
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009
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efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithmstrictly strong Nash equilibriumstudent-optimal deferred acceptance algorithmstudent-optimal von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matching
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Cited In (13)
- The core of school choice problems
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- Efficient matching under general constraints
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
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