On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.009MaRDI QIDQ485776zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Keisuke Bando

Publication date 14 January 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithmstrictly strong Nash equilibriumstudent-optimal deferred acceptance algorithmstudent-optimal von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
• A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
• A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Constrained school choice
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
• On cores and indivisibility
• On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
• School Choice with Consent^*
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(13)

• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• The core of school choice problems
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
• Epsilon-stability in school choice
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
• Efficient matching under general constraints
• Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
• Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings

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