Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.10.001MaRDI QIDQ2437848zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paula Jaramillo, Flip Klijn, Çağatay Kayı

Publication date 13 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10261/125692

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptancedropping strategiesfilled positionsmany-to-one matchingNash equilibriumwelfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Welfare economics (91B15) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
• Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
• Welfare maximization with deferred acceptance auctions in reallocation problems
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Equilibriums in differential games and problems of acceptance of offers
• STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
• Pure-strategy equilibria with non-expected utility players

Cites work

• A further note on the college admission game
• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets

Cited in

(6)

• Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
• STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS

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