Two finite and disjoint sets of colleges and students are considered. A linear order of colleges can be a preference of a student, but a linear order of students can be a preference for a college. \textit{The college admission game } will be played when each student and each college choose their preferences. The outcome is the allocation of students to colleges, determined by a predetermined algorithm. The author discusses additional assumptions and restrictions, as well as the necessary concepts, that customize the game to real market rules. The results are reported as filling gaps in the theory of incentives for the game. These are presented in the form of theorems which are typically named: General manipulability Theorem, General Impossibility Theorem, Characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and Stability of the equilibrium outcomes.
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- Constrained school choice
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
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