A further note on the college admission game
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Publication:662278
DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0278-6zbMath1242.91031OpenAlexW2077363676MaRDI QIDQ662278
Publication date: 22 February 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0278-6
Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (5)
Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets ⋮ The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
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