Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.012MaRDI QIDQ2078086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yusuke Iwase, Shoya Tsuruta, Akina Yoshimura

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.012

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityacyclicityNash implementationconstrained efficient stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A further note on the college admission game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Constrained school choice
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• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
• On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

Cited in

(3)

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