Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.008zbMath1280.91128OpenAlexW1978974927MaRDI QIDQ417718

Taro Kumano, Masahiro Watabe

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.008

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymultiple equilibriadeferred acceptance algorithmdominant strategy implementationweak nonbossiness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities

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