Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1341500
DOI10.1007/BF01215380zbMath0830.90004OpenAlexW2093267843MaRDI QIDQ1341500
José Alcalde, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 5 January 1995
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01215380
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Cites Work
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- Voting by Committees
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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