Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
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Publication:1929140
DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0131-9zbMath1282.91141MaRDI QIDQ1929140
Publication date: 7 January 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0131-9
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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