Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
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Publication:1296476
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00043-7zbMath0929.91018MaRDI QIDQ1296476
Anna Bogomolnaia, Salvador Barberá, Hans van der Stel
Publication date: 2 August 1999
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences, Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted, Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes, Fully sincere voting, Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges, Strategy-proof social choice correspondences., Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
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