Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00043-7zbMath0929.91018OpenAlexW2122427235WikidataQ126322534 ScholiaQ126322534MaRDI QIDQ1296476

Hans van der Stel, Anna Bogomolnaia, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00043-7

zbMATH Keywords

smoothnesslotteriessocial choice rulescontinuous strategy-proof probabilistic rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (20)

Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. ⋮ Manipulation of k-Approval Under De Re Knowledge ⋮ Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes ⋮ The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types ⋮ Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted ⋮ Collective choice under dichotomous preferences ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges ⋮ Fully sincere voting ⋮ Social Choice Theory

Cites Work

• A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
• The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules
• Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
• Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
• Collective Probabilistic Judgements
• Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes

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