Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
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Publication:1296476
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00043-7zbMATH Open0929.91018OpenAlexW2122427235WikidataQ126322534 ScholiaQ126322534MaRDI QIDQ1296476FDOQ1296476
Authors: Anna Bogomolnaia, Hans van der Stel, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 2 August 1999
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00043-7
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Cites Work
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
- Collective Probabilistic Judgements
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules
- The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules
Cited In (26)
- Social Choice Theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Nowak's Theorem on Probability Measures Induced by Strategies Revisited
- Responsive lotteries
- Multi-utilitarianism in two-agent quasilinear social choice
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A probabilistic model of social choice
- Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Salvador Barberà
- Fully sincere voting
- Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Manipulation of k-Approval Under De Re Knowledge
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
- Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
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