The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90035-7MaRDI QIDQ1164520zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta K. Pattanaik, R. Deb

Publication date 1982

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90035-7

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityoligarchycoalitional powerParetian liberalsprobabilistic group decision rulesprobabilistic social preferencesprobabilistic social welfare functionssubadditive veto power structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
• Social choice and individual values

Cited in

(7)

• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle
• Sophisticated preference aggregation
• The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice
• An axiomatic theory of political representation
• Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

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