Sophisticated preference aggregation

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0346-4MaRDI QIDQ734046zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. Remzi Sanver, Özer Selçuk

Publication date 19 October 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/sophisticated-preference-aggregation(77320006-f6f2-45c8-b554-feada6b71c7b).html

zbMATH Keywords

oligarchy theorempreferencesocial welfare functiontheorem of Arrow

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

Defining a sophisticated social preference for an option \(a\) over a different option \(b\) as the probability of choice of \(a\) in \(\{a,b\}\), restricting the domain of a social welfare function to profiles of absolute preferences, ties forbidden, and employing a hybrid transitivity condition, this paper establishes a relation from social welfare functions satisfying Pareto optimality and independence of irrelevant alternatives to oligarchies. These oligarchies, naturally including dictatorships, are determined by power distributions. The preference for \(a\) against \(b\) for the social welfare function determined by a given oligarchy is measured by the power allocated to the set of individuals who prefer \(a\) to \(b\).

Recommendations

• A foundation for Pareto aggregation
• Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
• Information and preference aggregation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2190132
• Positional independence in preference aggregation

Cites work

• A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference
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Cited in

(9)

• A foundation for Pareto aggregation
• Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. I: General agendas
• A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference
• Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures
• On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy
• Positional independence in preference aggregation
• Positional information and preference aggregation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3874913 (Why is no real title available?)
• Properties underlying a preference aggregator based on satisficing logic

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